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Abstract: The Covid-19 pandemic affects societies worldwide, challenging not only health sectors but also public 
administration systems in general. Understanding why public administrations perform well in the current situation—
and in times of crisis more generally—is theoretically of great importance, and identifying concrete factors driving 
successful administrative performance under today’s extraordinary circumstances could still improve current crisis 
responses. This article studies patterns of sound administrative performance with a focus on networks and knowledge 
management within and between crises. Subsequently, it draws on empirical evidence from two recent public 
administration surveys conducted in Germany in order to test derived hypotheses. The results of tests for group 
differences and regression analyses demonstrate that administrations that were structurally prepared, learned during 
preceding crises, and displayed a high quality in their network cooperation with other administrations and with the 
civil society, on average, performed significantly better in the respective crises.
Evidence for Practice
• While practitioners often prefer centralized and hierarchical solutions in times of crisis, this study highlights 
the potential of reflexive and adaptive use of multiactor networks to cope with the extraordinary.
• Administrations that are prepared and that display a high quality in their network cooperation with other 
administrations and with civil society, on average, performed significantly better in their respective crises.
• Knowledge management and resource sharing—both among administrative units and with civil society—
increase organizational ability to perform well in crisis situations.
• Administrations do best when lessons learned in crises are accessibly stored and when previously successful 
crisis networks can be quickly revitalized, thus allowing for intercrisis learning—documentation of best 
practices during crises—via smart or traditional forms of data storing and organizational memory keeping—
further boost the performance of administrations during succeeding crises.
• In the early stages of a crisis, decision makers need to invest in organizational self-awareness of how 
challenges are mastered and how insights about optimal coping are best passed on.
The Covid-19 pandemic challenges not only the health sectors in countries worldwide but also their public administration systems. Executing 
the necessary actions to ensure public health, such 
as tracking infections or organizing local health 
care, takes focus and binds capacities. Furthermore, 
implementing a lockdown means more tasks and 
responsibilities for local administrations: distributing 
aid for the local economy, enforcing the compliance of 
citizens and businesses with new rules and restrictions, 
and last but not least, reorganizing internal routines 
and procedures as services turn digital. Thus, local 
administrations’ capacity to cope with Covid-19 is 
crucially relevant for the effectiveness of the overall 
national antivirus strategy.
Notwithstanding the dramatic societal impact of a 
pandemic, from an administrative science perspective, 
the current situation is less exceptional than one 
might think. Technically speaking, administrations 
have had to deal intermittently with crises of different 
types over the last decades—and research on how 
administrations learn from such crises is growing 
(Boin and Lodge 2016; Kettl 2006; Lalonde 2007). 
The main questions are which factors drive successful 
organizational performance in times of crisis and which 
factors make public administration systems more resilient 
when facing extraordinary challenges.
Addressing these questions, this article proceeds 
as follows. Arguments about potential drivers of 
administrative performance in times of crisis are 
discussed. Based on that review, we develop and 
subsequently test a model of drivers of successful 
performance in times of crisis, thereby testing 
hypotheses related to intracrisis and intercrisis 
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learning and adaption (Moynihan 2008, 2009). The results from 
regression analyses and tests for group differences demonstrate 
that an administration’s quality of networking, level of structural 
preparedness, and ability to draw on lessons learned during 
preceding crises matter most for successful administrative 
performance in crisis situations because those administrations that 
had these factors in place performed significantly better in the 
respective crises.
Literature Review
The Covid-19 crisis constitutes a textbook example of a “wicked” 
or “nonroutine” problem for governments and administrations 
(Kettl 2005, 2006). Such nonroutine problems are said to 
occur with ever greater frequency and are “characterized by high 
consequentiality, limited time, high political salience, uncertainty, 
and ambiguity” (Moynihan 2008, 351). Such wicked problem 
crises are studied, inter alia, by focusing on organizational 
change and bureaucratic behavior (Peters, Pierre, and Randma-
Liiv 2011; Simon 1947). Research questions often revolve around 
dichotomies informed by innovation and network theories that 
frame administrative crisis responses as based either on status quo 
behavior or on innovations that induce disruptive adjustments 
in procedures and structures. Further dichotomies present actor 
interaction as pursued in a hierarchical, top-down manner or 
through collaboration in decentralized and horizontal networks, 
and consider whether learning strategies focus exclusively on current 
conditions or apply a comparative logic.
Tradition versus Innovation
In this context, the question is “whether governments maintain 
their well-worn paths of governing or whether the crisis becomes the 
source of change, and perhaps fundamental change, in the patterns 
of governance” (Peters, Pierre, and Randma-Liiv 2011, 16). This 
question also applies to how single administrations respond—either 
by trusting in traditional behavior or by trying new paths, in other 
words, innovation. Which strategy is better is fiercely debated. On the 
one hand, it is argued that tradition is more efficient and effective—
crises are hardly the most favorable times to ask administrations to 
change, let alone reinvent procedural routines or engage in outright 
restructuring and adjustment. Indeed, quite the opposite, “threat 
rigidity may occur, whereby people respond to new threats in a rigid 
and inflexible manner, recycling previous responses and known 
routines for new problems” (Moynihan 2008, 351). On the other 
hand, extraordinary circumstances can sometimes reveal organizational 
capacity for transformation, motivating staff to excel and leaders to 
put turf wars aside, thus facilitating beneficial changes unlikely to be 
achieved in normal times (Peters, Pierre, and Randma-Liiv 2011, 16).
Hierarchy versus Networks
Since learning and innovation in crises are seen as functions of 
how the relevant actors interact, the mode of crisis coordination 
constitutes another central issue of the debate. The main alternatives 
are either investing in strengthening the center’s top-down steering 
capacity or in developing decentral capacities and intensifying 
horizontal information exchange. Opposing logics are at work here 
as “a command and control model, often presented by practitioners, 
champions a hierarchical approach” while “a coordination and 
communication model argues that crisis response inevitably depends 
on collaborative processes to succeed” (Moynihan 2009, 897). 
Many studies contend that bundling as well as centralization is, 
firstly, preferable in terms of the speed and coherence of decisions, 
and, secondly, almost impossible to avoid given not only the need 
for strong leadership, but also the likelihood that opportunistic 
behavior will emerge in times of crisis, prompting administrations 
“to defend their own ‘turf,’ and perhaps especially to defend their 
own budgets” (Peters, Pierre, and Randma-Liiv 2011, 16).
However, the greater the complexity of a wicked problem, the more 
pronounced are the doubts that fostering hierarchy constitutes the 
optimal crisis response, as the center risks becoming overwhelmed. 
In such situations, networks reveal their strengths. They provide agile 
horizontal cooperation by referring “to structures involving multiple 
nodes—agencies and organizations—with multiple linkages, 
ordinarily working on cross-boundary collaborative activities” 
(McGuire and Agranoff 2011, 266). Indeed, networks are based 
on the principle of managing complex issues through decentralized 
structures in order to adapt more effectively to local circumstances 
(Agranoff 2008). As such, they perform different, though not 
mutually exclusive functions, from service delivery and information 
diffusion to direct problem solving and community capacity building 
(Milward and Provan 2006). Networks are thus particularly helpful 
in managing crises as crisis response “requires gaining consensus or, 
at least, acquiescence across the society and decentralization may 
be a useful strategy for producing that legitimacy for the proposed 
changes” (Peters, Pierre, and Randma-Liiv 2011, 18).
Especially under conditions of great uncertainty, when it is 
far from clear what the best response might be, strategies of 
decentralization and networking are particularly valuable as they are 
said to enlarge problem-solving capacity (Edlefsen and Staemmler 
2018; Kettl 2006). In that sense, a network strategy that brings 
together a wide range of authorities, professional organizations, 
associations, and volunteers hedges the administration against 
threatening overload (Alford 2009; Bovaird 2007). In sum, what 
makes networks superior in crisis reaction is their potential to learn 
and to deviate from beaten paths (Milward and Provan 2006; 
Moynihan 2008, 351; Torfing 2016).
Situational versus Comparative Learning
Innovation and learning are intimately linked concepts. Innovation 
implies that established structures and processes that do not function 
sufficiently in crises are substituted. However, “without learning 
in advance about how to deal with such threats, we tend to pull 
old game plans off the shelf to deal with new problems. If all we 
have are backward-looking plans, we doom ourselves to repeated 
failure” (Kettl 2006, 277). In other words, organizations need 
preparation and capacities to learn in order to respond effectively 
to wicked problem crises. Two issues of knowledge management 
stand out when it comes to preparedness: how can lessons learned 
in one situation be stored, and how can such insights be made 
available when the next crisis breaks out. In other words, how can 
evidence-based situational learning be transformed into learning 
comparatively across cases? (Hartley, Sørensen, and Torfing 2013; 
Lalonde 2007; Neustadt and May 1986). In this respect, 
documentation is of utmost importance. Preserving knowledge 
of failures, successes, and instrument effectivity is a necessary 
condition for learning. How exactly an administration draws upon 
and applies insights gleaned in previous crisis situations may differ 
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and remains an empirical question. However, without storing 
and documenting past experiences, preparedness probabilities go 
down. Our considerations about the complementarity of the two 
styles of learning—i.e., focusing on one situation or accumulating 
and adapting strategies over time—are linked to the concept of 
“intracrisis learning” and “intercrisis learning” developed by Donald 
Moynihan (2008, 2009). Accordingly, intracrisis learning implies 
the direct reflection and adoption of new processes or adjustments 
regarding structures and actors whenever traditional schemes can no 
longer be usefully applied, while intercrisis learning includes drawing 
lessons from the past, in particular former crises, and adapting 
existing strategies to the needs of specific units or departments.
Each of the dichotomies discussed above—traditional versus 
innovation, hierarchy versus networks, situational versus comparative 
learning—is a crude and necessarily selective simplification. Together, 
they are neither exhaustive nor even mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, 
they provide a useful analytic framework, specifically positing that, 
when faced with wicked problems, administrations that respond with 
innovative solutions, intensifying networks, and intracrisis as well 
as intercrisis learning capacities work better than administrations 
that rely on traditional, top-down approaches only. As such, the 
succeeding empirical analysis is guided by the following hypotheses:
• Intracrisis learning: Administrations that within a crisis enlarge 
and in particular deepen networks of different types (in terms 
of intense and good cooperation) with actors from the civil 
society, other administrative units, or private enterprises, 
and document measures undertaken, exhibit high levels of 
administrative performance.
• Intercrisis learning: Administrations that within a crisis take 
stock of existing structures, in particular networks with 
stakeholders that were created in former crises, exhibit high 
levels of administrative performance.
Data and Methods
Data
The empirical part of the study is based on the analysis of data 
from two original online surveys, conducted in Germany in 2019 
and 2020, using the software Unipark. Both questionnaires tap 
into local administrators’ work environment, intraorganizational 
structural change in the context of the respective “crisis,” 
networking activities, knowledge storage and management, as well 
as the sociodemographic details of the municipality.
The first survey was conducted in the aftermath of the increased 
refugee migration (“refugee crisis”) in summer 2015. It went to 
German integration officers as well as immigration and social 
authorities in the area of asylum in all major German cities with 
over 100,000 inhabitants; additionally, all municipalities with the 
initial letters D, E, H, K, N, R, and S in all federal states were 
included in the sample, as were all administrators and mayors of 
Germany’s districts. The survey was conducted between July and 
November 2019. Overall, 2,998 respondents were invited, of whom 
750 participated, equaling a response rate of 25 percent.
The second survey taps into the effects of the Covid-19 pandemic 
that hit the local level early in 2020. All German health authorities, 
district administrators, and mayors were contacted as well as all 
municipalities that begin with the initial letter M. Between April 
and May 2020, from 1,700 municipalities, 354 took part, equaling 
a response rate of about 21 percent.1
Estimation Model
Aiming to detect the impact of different influencing factors on 
administrative performance, generalized linear estimation models 
(GLM) were applied. A direct interpretation of the coefficient is not 
possible in such nonlinear models; therefore, the coefficient Exp (b) 
can be understood as an “odd ratio” (or “effect size”) and specifies 
the factor by which the probability ratio changes if the predictor is 
increased by one unit. Hence, if Exp (b) > 1, the respective indicator 
has a positive effect on the dependent variable; if Exp (b) < 1, the 
respective indicator has a negative effect.2
Dependent Variable. Different measures were used to specify the 
“performance of the PA” in response to challenges posed by the 
respective crises, all information for constructing the variables stems 
from our surveys.3 For both studies, we constructed indicators as 
delineated in detail below from the following questions, providing a 
1–5 Likert scale for the answers (from very good (5) to very little (1)):
(a) “In your opinion, to what extent does the reaction related to the 
management of migration and flight (or: related to the management 
of the current Covid-19 pandemic) demonstrate the efficiency and 
innovative capacities of the local government?”
(b) “All in all, how effectively do you think your administration copes 
with the challenges of the migration flows (or: the current pandemic)?”
Using the answers to questions (a) and (b), we constructed an index, 
ranging from 2–10, that indicates low to high performance levels. 
Based on this index, we created the following dummy variables: 
“Performance of PA,” which is equal to 1 when the value of the 
index is equal to or higher than 8, and 0 otherwise; “Performance 
of PA High,” that is equal to 1 once the value of the index is equal 
to or higher than 9; and 0 otherwise “Effectiveness,” which is 
equal to 1 when question (b) is answered with “very effectively” or 
“effectively,” and 0 otherwise.
Independent Variables. As for the independent variables, different 
dummies were created from survey answers to capture the measures 
undertaken by the public administrations in the context of the 
respective crisis.
Cooperation and networks (used in both samples). For the indicators 
“Quality of Network Civil Society” and “Quality of Network 
Administration,” the respective dummy equals 1 when the question 
“Did the interaction with the civil society/other administrative units 
work well” is answered with “fully agree” or “agree,” and 0 otherwise.
For the indicators “Intensification Network Civil Society” and 
“Intensification of Network Administration,” the respective dummy 
equals 1 when the network was intensified in the respective crisis, 
and 0 otherwise.
Preparedness. (a) Indicators used in the Migration Sample. For the 
indicators “Coordination with other administrations ex ante” and 
“Coordination with Civil Society ex ante,” the respective dummy 
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Table 2 Drivers of Performance of PA—Results for the Covid-19 Pandemic
i ii ii iv v
Variable Performance of PA Effectiveness Performance of PA High
Intercept 1,571 (0.4835) 0.824 (0.9018) 0.471 (0.4287)** 0.125 (0.7500)***
Quality coordination with administration 25,773 (0.8638)*** 13,476 (0.8091)*** 12,121 (0.7828)***
Quality coordination with civil society 1,121 (0.4800)
Preparedness overall 2,688 (0.5097)** 2,108 (0.4800)*
Preparedness civil society 2,922 (0.4876)**
N 101 101 101 101 101
Notes: Significance level ***1%, **5%, *10%, standard error in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
equals 1 when the respondent indicated that the administration used 
and revitalized networks with civil society/other administrations 
created before the “migration crisis,” and equals 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, the dummy “Documentation” indicates that within 
the “refugee crisis,” changes and adaptions were documented for 
future use by other individuals, units, or stakeholders.
(b) Indicators used in the Covid-19 Sample. For the indicators 
“Preparedness Civil Society,” “Preparedness Administration,” and 
“Preparedness Private,” a respective dummy was created that equals 
1 when the respondent indicated that the administration used 
and revitalized networks with civil society/other administrations 
that were created in the “migration crisis,” and equals 0 otherwise. 
Furthermore, a dummy “Preparedness Overall” was created that 
becomes 1 once two or more of the previous dummies turn 1, and 
becomes 0 otherwise.
Results and Discussion
Applying different models on our data, we found the following 
links between the different independent variables and the respective 
indicator for performance of the PA.
As can be drawn from Table 1, indicators for documentation, 
for preparedness of the administration thanks to the use of ex 
ante established networks, and for the quality of cooperation 
and networking with different actors display significant positive 
coefficients, indicating a positive influence of these factors on 
performance in the “refugee crisis”.
As for our second sample on administrative performance in the 
current Covid-19 pandemic, we found the following links.
As can be drawn from Table 2, indicators for the preparedness of 
the administration due to the use of networks and cooperations 
that were installed in the previous “refugee crisis,” as well as for the 
quality of cooperation and networking with different actors, display 
significant positive coefficients, indicating a positive influence of 
these factors on performance in the Covid-19 pandemic.
Additionally, we used a nonparametric Mann–Whitney U test to 
detect group differences in the data set for Covid-19 (see Table 
A1 in the appendix). As the grouping variables, we used the three 
dummies for administrative performance. We found significant 
evidence of group differences, substantiating our findings that 
administrations that were prepared and that displayed a high quality 
in their network cooperation with other administrations and with 
civil society, on average, performed significantly better in their 
respective crises.
Interpreting the results against the backdrop of the theoretical 
discussion, we conclude that both intracrisis and intercrisis learning 
are relevant to achieve or maintain a good performance in times of 
crisis and that the two concepts complement each other to a certain 
extent.
First, intracrisis learning in terms of documentation of helpful 
practices for use within a crisis as well as cooperation and 
networking with stakeholders increases performance. Other 
indicators (not displayed) that account for the sheer enlargement 
of networks intracrisis remain insignificant in all models for the 
“refugee crisis” as well as the Covid-19 pandemic. In other words, 
the quality of cooperation matters. For both crises, “good” and 
intense cooperation with other administrations and actors from 
civil society intracrisis has a significant positive effect on the overall 
performance of the PA.4 Hence, general tensions between efficiency 
and networking cannot be identified. This result confirms previous 
empirical findings (e.g., McGuire and Agranoff 2011) suggesting 
that operational networks outrank hierarchical solutions in terms 
of performance. This would justify network-related (transaction) 
Table 1 Drivers of Performance of PA—Results for the Refugee Crisis
Variable
i ii iii iv v
Performance of PA Effectiveness Performance of PA High
Intercept 1,617 (.0893)*** 1,207 (.1070)* 1,192 (0.2608) 0.055 (.6062)*** 0.382 (.2318)***
Coordination with other administrations ex ante 1,806 (.2413)** 1,621 (.2466)** 0.594 (0.3869)
Coordination with civil society ex ante 1,171 (0.297) 1,064 (0.2654) 1,835 (0.3773)*
Documentation 2,338 (0.1736)*** 1,821 (0.2608)*** 1,630 (0.2985)* 1,920 (0.2862)**
Quality coordination with civil society 1,786 (0.2768)** 2,355 (0.4674)*
Quality coordination with administration 1,951 (0.2610)*** 4,977 (0.4377)***
N 682 678 409 227 227
Notes: Significance level: ***1%, **5%, *10%, standard error in parentheses.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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costs for the public sector (Agranoff 2006), because the stability and 
quality of networks bring greater effectiveness (Moynihan 2009; 
Provan and Kenis 2008).
Second, intercrisis learning resulting in preparedness matters. In 
the case of the “refugee crisis,” a significant positive effect on 
performance of the administration can be detected if networks 
with civil society and other administrations that were extended and 
intensified before the crisis could be revitalized. For the Covid-19 
pandemic, indicators that denote that the respective networks—
with civil society, other administrative units, and the private 
sector—were built ex ante in the “refugee crisis” and revitalized in 
the pandemic, reveal a significant positive effect on performance 
of the administration during the pandemic. Hence, when faced 
with a new crisis, learning from previous experiences and events 
helps by augmenting administrative performance (Kettl 2006; 
Moynihan 2008).
Conclusion
This paper answers the call by Boin and Lodge (2016) for public 
administration scholars to focus on the management of crises, 
especially regarding the collaboration with nonstate actors. Evidence 
from refugee migration to Germany in 2015 as well as from the 
ongoing Covid-19 pandemic suggests that networks are indeed 
crucial for the successful performance of local public administration 
in times of crisis. While the concrete meaning of “successful 
performance” depends on the respective type of administration (and 
may have a very different signification for a local health authority in 
the Covid-19 pandemic compared to an immigration registration 
office in the context of refugee migration), the study identifies 
drivers of administrative performance more abstractly. In addition 
to relying extensively on networks, these drivers are documentation 
of best practices and the ability to revitalize structures and insights 
derived from former crises. Additionally, we found significant 
evidence of group differences, substantiating our findings that 
administrations that were prepared and that displayed a high quality 
in their network cooperation, on average, performed significantly 
better in the respective crises. In short, successful performance 
probabilities rise with the ability to make good use of previous 
experience. Intracrisis and intercrisis learning are thus intimately 
connected, the former being a prerequisite of the latter.
The results of this study suggest further avenues for research. First, 
the potential of reflexive and adaptive use of multiactor networks to 
cope with extraordinary circumstances should be further explored 
and empirically tested. Second, as successful performance in crisis 
situations seems to depend upon the sharing of knowledge and the 
ability to coordinate the public and private divide, investigating the 
conditions of communication and collaboration across domains 
should remain central to scholars of public management—especially 
if they are interested in understanding how crises are overcome 
organizationally. Third, given that one of the very reasons for 
bureaucracies to emerge was their superior ability to provide 
accessible memory as the basis to make decisions, it is probably 
time to revisit this memory function with a view to appropriately 
translating it to the digital age. This would help to improve our 
understanding of how lessons already learned are stored and kept 
accessible to inform subsequent emergency responses. Investing in the 
organizational capacity to benefit from lessons already learned is likely 
to pay out. What do these findings mean for those in the crisis now 
and for the future? Improving networking could help organizational 
responses to the current Covid-19 crisis; improving organizational 
memory and learning could help responses to crises as yet unknown.
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Notes
1. Depending on the concrete answers given (e.g., if specific networks were 
revitalized in the respective crisis), not all cases from the respective survey could 
be included in the estimation models. This fact explains the generally lower 
number of cases considered in the estimation models, compared to the overall 
sample size. Furthermore, the selection logic—addressing fewer administrations, 
focusing on health authorities being addressed in the middle of a health crisis—
accounts for the overall lower number of cases in the second survey.
2. While only the results of the logit model that exhibit a high fit of the model are 
displayed, as a robustness check, we also tested probit models for all specifications.
3. The dependent variable is based on self-reported perception data—the answer is 
not a neutrally observable number or measure, but an own assessment or the 
perception about the performance of the administration in the respective crisis as 
reported by the respondent. Self-reported and perception data may suffer from 
specific disadvantages, as answers may be exaggerated, respondents may be too 
embarrassed to reveal details of more personal nature, or biases toward social 
desirability or overestimation of results due to missing neutral information may 
occur. Nonetheless, these effects tend to be most problematic when it comes to 
personal sentiments or achievements, but less so when organizational 
performance can be relatively precisely judged by individuals from within the 
organization. Biases are less likely in these cases as no personal information is 
asked for and the focus is not on personal performance. For our study, one can 
assume that internal validity is given as, first, the “cause” precedes the “effect” in 
time, and second, the “cause” and the “effect” tend to occur together, and lastly, 
because there are no scientifically justifiable alternative explanations for the 
observed covariation. External validity can be seen as given as applying the 
conclusions outside the context of this specific study is possible.
4. As for cooperation with civil society, the effect is also positive, but not significant 
in all models. Nonetheless, as the effect size and strength are as expected, the 
most likely reason for the missing significance is a methodological problem, 
rooted in the relatively small n tested.
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Grouping variable: Preparedness
Mann–Whitney U 11,576,000 11,218,500 11,695,500
Wilcoxon W 34,154,000 36,194,500 36,671,500
Z −3,449 −4,513 −3,635
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .001*** .000*** .000***
Grouping variable: Quality coordination with administration
Mann–Whitney U 7,606,500 6,885,000 8,629,500
Wilcoxon W 13,601,500 12,880,000 14,624,500
Z −8,300 −8,914 −5,698
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000*** .000*** .000***
Grouping variable: Quality coordination with civil society
Mann–Whitney U 10,464,500 10,898,000 11,682,500
Wilcoxon W 21,639,500 22,073,000 22,857,500
Z −5,995 −5,016 −3,548
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .000*** .000*** .000***
Notes: Significance level ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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